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Abstract
Despite the HFACS usefulness critics of this framework argue that it is ineffective in identifying the problem beyond the 
organisation level. This study, therefore examines the HFACS from the system approach. By examining the system; there is an 
emphasis on the work conditions and organisation processes an individual is placed, to carry out the required task. This 
influences both within and outside the organisation, leads to an error, hence, the establishment of the HFACS-HE.The HFACS-
HE includes other external factors outside the organisation level causal to unsafe acts and unsafe situation. A comparative and 
documentary analysis of a selected offshore helicopter transport industry accident report from the United Kingdom and Nigeria 
was carried out using the HFACS-HE model. The outcome of the comparative analysis of the HFACS-HE model via the 
documentary investigations revealed that causal factors such as public, regulatory and politics have not been included in the 
original HFACS framework. These factors would be useful during the investigation process. Secondly, the study can be 
compared and replicated by other studies already carried out in other similar contexts. By using the structured system framework 
to identify human errors in accidents, the HFACS-HE can be used in other safety critical industries to enable effective safety 
interventions.
© 2015 The Authors.Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference.
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1. Introduction
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System, (HFACS) is one of the most extensive and widely 
adopted tools for accident investigation. It purports to be a systemtool, but is it?This paper, however, poses to apply 
the framework from the system theory claims. This is because the HFACS tool is widely applicable in the aviation 
industry. Byexamining the system; there is an emphasis on the work conditions and organisation processes an 
individual is placed, to carry out the required task. This emphasis is not overly expressed in the original HFACS 
framework. These are influences from both within and outside the organisation leading to an error.Human error lies 
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within all accidents and investigation proceeding. As a result, several theories, taxonomies and frameworks had been 
developed over the years to understand the underlining human error. These frameworks can be classified as 
traditional – industrial system which views investigation, proceeding based on a series of events usually leading to 
blame. The contemporary view is established on the principle of system engineering, investigating accident 
proceedings based on the whole complex, interactive, dynamic system comprising of several subsystems or 
components.
Consequently, theories and models established from the system theory claim that errors leading to accidents are 
linked to several interactions among the system component with no single causal factor as the primary reason. This 
approach sees an unsafe act as component interaction with the environment leading to insecurity within the system 
as an emergent property. These unsafe acts which lead to accidents can only occur when there is a violation of the 
set constraints on the components due to interaction (Leveson, 2002). On the other hand, the traditional models 
focus on the unsafe act, rather than investigating what went wrong with the whole system which could have led to 
the error (Salmon et al, 2014).By introducing the outside influences into the traditional socio-technical frameworkin
the analysis of offshore helicopter accidents, it bridges the gap between the old HFACS to the new HFACS-HE 
framework. The HFACS-HE includes other external factors outside the organisation level causal to unsafe acts and 
unsafe situation. Accordingly, a comparative analysis will be carried out on the helicopter industry between 
two countries to identify the external contributory factors accidents using the HFACS-HE model.
2. Overview ofHFACS framework
The framework specified the four levels of levels of failure with each level correlating with each layer within the 
Reason model. These levels include (a.) unsafe acts (b.) unsafe acts, pre-conditional, (c.) unsafe supervision and 
lastly (d.) unsafe organisational factors. This first level of HFACS describes the unsafe acts of the operator, which 
directly led to an incident or accident. This level is typically referred to as operator error or pilot errors and is where 
most accident investigations are focused (Wiegmann and Shappell, 1997; 1999; 2003).The unsafe acts are easy to 
identify and most of the times apportion blame to the few individual directly concerned with the error. They are 
further classified into errors and violations, errors are activities that fail to achieve the desired outcomes which are 
further sub-divided into three parts - skill-based, decision, and perceptual errors. On the other hand, violation can be 
viewed as a conscious effort to disregard established rules and regulations, this can further sub-divided into two 
routine and exceptional violations.
Preconditions are usually latent system failures that lay inactive for long periods of time before ever contribute to 
an accident. While unsafe acts executed by the operator are continually linked to accidents, the preconditions for
unsafe acts must also be understood and dealt with in order to reduce errors leading to incidents or accidents. 
Accordingly, understanding these preconditions wherein an individual is placed under will assist in identifying other 
areas for organizational improvements. Preconditions for unsafe acts include environmental factors, conditions of 
the operator, and personnel factors.Unsafe supervision is divided into four categories, inadequate leadership, 
planned inappropriate operations, failure to correct known problems, and leadership violations. Contributing to the 
leadership influence is organizational failures which can also be further traced to latent errors within the highest 
levels. These latent conditions regularly go unnoticed during accident investigations. This is because these errors are 
difficult to find unless a clear understanding of the organization’s framework is understood, defined and a consistent 
accident investigation framework used. Organizational factors are resource management, organizational climate and 
organizational process.
Within the Oil & Gas operations, HFACS applies to accidents installations for production or drilling. HFACS 
was used to balance the Man-Technology-Organization (MTO) to become a merged framework. One significant 
outcome was the use of employees with different cultural context and understanding of procedures/documentation 
and communication. HFACS & MTO provided a common framework for comparison of accidents and incidents at 
various levels of the framework (Aas, 2008).This framework provides more details on each side of the human error 
sequence, which is utilised during accident investigation. Nevertheless, critics of this framework had argued that the 
frame is effective in identifying the problem, but lack corresponding solutions to solve problems. Furthermore, the 
model could lead to confusion when it comes to categorization and analysis. (Beaubien, 2002) Furthermore, Dekker, 
2002 suggested the HFACS had the problem of analyst hindsight which could potentially lead to counterfactual 
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interpretation and overgeneralization of causality. According to Leveson 2012 in criticizing the Swiss 
cheese/HFACS model agrees the model is easy to understand, unfortunately she also concurs with other researchers 
with regards to the oversimplification of the causality.
HFACS, like other event model over the years had achieved its reliability in identifying one or several failures 
leading to an accident, however, this framework can easily miss subtle and complex coupling and interactions 
among failure events thereby omitting latent component event failure. Therefore, it does not seem to effectively 
explain accidents involving human failures at all levels as well as technological design in highly adaptive tightly-
coupled, complex interactive socio-technical systems such as the aviation industry (Leveson, 2004, 2012). HFACS 
had been a useful tool for resolving an accident investigation with in-depth explanation of the root cause analysis. 
The framework reveals both the active and latent condition and their interaction leading to an accident limited to the 
level of the organisation. Taking into account the use of the HFACS framework, the question is can the framework 
can be applied effectively in the context of the system approach especially beyond the level of the organisation?
3. Adapted HFACS-HE framework
The HFACS was adapted to form the HFACS-HE, these includes External influences, the fifth level incorporates 
influences outside of the organization/company based on Rasmussen, 1997 system approach. This level includes 
government, regulators, manufacturer, social, environmental, political, economic and customers influence, etc. The 
HFACS-HE framework can be seen in Figure 1. This level is based on solving complex problems from the system 
level of interaction.Government: The government is responsible for creating the laws governing the industry, based 
on the safety review of accident analysis. The government enables to regulatory bodies to work independently to
Fig. 1. HFACS-HE adapted from Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003, Source: Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003
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oversight the industry by regulating and investigate accident and incidents. This is done by providing the necessary 
budget to carry out its activities. In the HFACS-HE analysis the government will be classified into government 
resource management, governing climate, and governing process.Regulatory Factors: the regulatory bodies are 
responsible for the industry and the workers it oversees. The regulatory bodies split into many groups, but the two 
main groups are accident investigators and the inspectorate. The inspectorate regulates the industry and provides 
advice and guidance. In the HFACS-HE analysis the regulatory factors will be classified into regulatory resource
management, regulatory climate, and regulatory process.
Is this enough?Despite a further two levels being added to the HFACS method there are yet further system layers 
which could conceivably exert an influence.Outside influences: the organisations are also faced with various outside 
factors that influence the safe operation. The manufacturers are faced with providing the industry with the up-to-date 
aircraft design, technology and maintenance guidance for safe operation. In turn, the customers, puts commercial 
and economic pressure on the organization, thus increasing productivity, which could lead to potential overworking 
of the employees. The society in which an organization is located might pressure the organization to making policies 
to promote the unity of the community. For instance, the security unrest in the Niger-Delta was caused by militants 
because of the aggression involving the locals, government and the oil-producing companies. Legal pressure is 
always a concern as many organizations because of blame and liabilities. All of these outside influences have the 
ability to adversely affect the safe performance of a company recognized them and steps taken to alleviate their 
impact.This study aims at identifying these external factors and its influences on the accidents.
4. Data collection
4.1. Design
Two formal air accident reports were subjected to an in-depth content analysis. These were selected because they 
were both human factors case studies that would offer HFACS a good stress test.Secondly the assumption that 
HFACS will be able to tell the operational difference between Nigeria and UK.
4.2. Materials
The report was collected from aviation accidents on the AIB website (http://www.aib.gov.ng/) and the AAIB website 
(http://www.aaib.gov.uk/). The accident report was up for public access, no de-identification of information was done. 
The report provided almost all the information about the accident in details. These include the sequences of events 
leading to and after the accidents, the immediate and the causal factors, contributory and underlying causes and the 
investigation recommendations. The reportswere selected because it was human factor related to identifiable active 
and latent factors observed leading to the accident. The analysis was comparative in nature using content analysis.
4.3. Procedure
HFACS-HE codes were identified using the sequences of events leading to and after the accidents, the immediate 
and the causal factors, contributory and underlying causes and the investigation recommendations. Each HFACS-
HE category was counted a maximum of one time per case. This count acted as an indication of the presence or 
absence of a given category for the accident. Subsequent category codes were also classified for the analysis.
4.4. Data analysis
Each of the accident reports were coded based on the HFACS-HE categories. Inter-coding reliability was 
assessed through a triangulation process by providing the two accident reports (one each from Nigeria and the 
United Kingdom) to two individuals with no prior knowledge of the study; training was given for the coding 
process. This process was required to assess the internal consistency of the coding process. The process also helped 
to identify conflicts in coding which were re-assessed and either resigned or rejected. A correlation analysis 
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revealedthe agreement presence of the coding scheme. The highest coder showed .70 correlation agreements in the 
coding present of the selected reports.
5. Results and discussions
The results of this analysis identified causal factors at all levels. For both the external factors, organizational 
influence and unsafe leadership tiers, causal factors tended to spread within all the categories. When comparing the 
differences identified between Nigeria and United Kingdom there are a few cautions that must be presented. The 
most significant is that data collected from two different sources. Although both data sets were collected from 
government sources and the investigators involved in the cases similar, but level of experience and rigorous 
investigation might differ. In both cases, biases can occur.As a result, care should be taken not to take compare the 
accidents by the number of codes. The most importantly point is the context of the discussion which is based on the 
sub-categories occurring at each level unsafe act.
Figure 2a shows the differences in the unsafe act of the individual that caused the accidents versus the countries 
the accident occurred. The most often identified causal category at the unsafe acts level was judgement and decision 
making errors. Within judgement and decision making errors in the top two factors— risk assessment during 
operation and decision making during operation errors are linked to the UK accident report, while necessary action –
rushed were equally cited in the two accident reports. This is not surprising as necessary actions taken during rush 
create an increased potential for severe accidents.As a result, in respective of the country of operation when pilots 
take necessary actions to avoid an error in haste, it could eventually lead to adverse situations.
The most often identified skill-based error casual factor for both countries’ accidents was over control/under 
control of the helicopter during flight. Procedural error has been the second most frequently identified error factor 
leading to unsafe act, although this factor was coded higher in the Nigeria report. In both countries accident reports, 
risk assessment violations were as identified causal factor.This factor occurs when the pilots risk violating a 
recognized procedure because a situation was consciously assessed the action taken was the best option in the 
situation. For instance, the co-pilot’s intentional deviation from a safe flight profile because of limited visual cues. A 
clear distinction between violations, errors occurring in the two countries are violation in the Nigerian report 
reflected a lack of discipline by the pilot and routine violation in the UK reports. The difference shows individual 
action against the company rules, this is referred to as knowingly disregarding the standard operating procedure, 
while the other is a tolerated cultural work attitude within the company. Flight crews may be more prone to unsafe 
acts in a situation where the preconditions for unsafe acts are present. The preconditions were associated with 19.0% 
of the Nigeria report compared to 39.4% in the UK report. This difference implies the number of times 
preconditions were coded in the accident report. The most often identified precondition to unsafe acts for the two 
countries was different. In the Nigeria report, psycho-behavioural factors were mostly coded, while personnel
factors was most identified in the UK (see Figure 2b). In the Nigeria report the psychological well being of the pilot 
was a major contributor which led to the accident. In the UK report, the crew interaction, the lack of 
communication, cross-monitoring performance, etc. were often coded and identified as a contributing factor.
The majority of causal factors at this level fell into the inadequate leadership category. Planned inappropriate 
operation was also a highly coded causal factor at this level. Unsafe supervision was identified in 19.6% of the
Fig. 2.(a) Unsafe acts; (b) Preconditions to unsafe acts.
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codesanalysed as shown in Figure 3a). Failure to correct a known problem was also a highly cited causal factor at 
this level. When examining unsafe supervision more closely, local training issues/programs (a subcategory of the 
inadequate leadership category) were found to be the most often causal factor at this level.The biggest problems 
with training oversight resulted from lack of adequate monitoring of the individual work practices, i.e. pilots, 
because they work in isolation, leading to unsafe working activities and decisions not being identified or corrected. 
Inadequate training can further lead to a lack of the knowledge base required for safe operations, increasing the risk 
of committing errors. Issues with problem correction were primarily focused on the failure of a supervisor to 
identify a pilot who is exhibiting recognisable risky and unsafe behaviours such as the Nigeria report. While, the 
failure of a supervisor to correct known hazardous practices, guidance and conditions led to an unsafe situation such 
as the UK report. With no sufficient guidance of SOPs, rules, and regulations, pilots are an increased risk for 
committing errors.
Causal factors at the organisational level are less often acknowledged during the investigation process. Unlike the 
unsafe supervision, organisational influences were associated with a significantly higher percentage of code (54.8%) 
accident reports. In fact, the percentage of codes associated with organizational factors were three times higher than 
supervisor influence and about half of the whole codes in the two reports (Figure 3b).Within organisational 
influences, organisational processes were the most often identified causal category for both the Nigeria and UK 
accident reports. Within this category, in the Nigeria problems with program oversight and program management, 
program and policy risk assessment were most often identified. Within this category, in the UK problems with 
organisational training issues and programs, procedural guidance and publications, program oversight and program 
management were mostly identified.
Given that lack of effective program oversight and program management in both countries associated with the 
accident reports, it appears that improvements in organisational program oversight and management are needed in 
order to reduce severe accidents of this nature.It is very important that not only there be safety programs, but that 
these programs should be reviewed and updated, reflecting the safest operating practices, and circulated to staff. 
Generally, organizational deficiencies seem to be are more likely to result in accidents. As a result, effective error 
management should be developed and implemented at every level of HFACS-HE.The external factors identified in 
this report include regulatory influences, customer influences, helideck operator influences and other outside 
external factors such as the politics and security. The following session below discusses these coded factors. For 
simplicity, the customer and regulatory categories were sub-categories are similar to that of the organisational 
influences. The other factors are classified as single causal factors leading to unsafe situations. Causal factors at the 
regulatory level were coded as the least contributing factor with 3.8% of codes analysed in the Nigerian report. 
Regulatory processes accounted for the majority of the codes identified at this level. This category was identified in 
75% of codes analysed followed by the regulatory resource management with 25%. In the UK report, causal factors 
at the regulatory level were coded as another contributing factor with 8.3% of codes analysed.
Unlike organizational influences, regulatory influences were associated with a less percentage of code (12.1%) 
accident reports. Within regulatory influences, regulatory processes were the most often identified causal 
categoryfor both the Nigeria and UK accident reports. Within this category, program oversight and program 
management were most often identified. On the other hand, within the regulatory climate category, in the UK 
problems with regulatory unit msn/ac/vehicle/equip change or unit deactivation influences were mostly identified. 
This causalfactor results from the unsafe situation created during the process of changing equipment or an 
impending unit
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Fig.3.(a) Unsafe Leadership; (b)Organisational Influences.
deactivation.Causal factors at the customer level in Nigeria were coded as another major contributing factor with 
16.2% of codes analysed. Resource management accounted for the majority of the codes identified at this level. This 
category was identified in 65% of codes analysed, followed by the organisational process with 18%.Within the 
resources management category, 18.2% of codes were coded under Air Traffic Control Resources, Airfield 
Resources, Acquisition Policies/Design Processes and Informational Resources/Support respectively.This category 
dealt with the non-provision of resources necessary for safe operation, hence, leading to an unsafe situation. The 
customer – Mobil Producing Nigeria (MPN) was using an unlicensed heliport with untrained staff. In addition, staff 
was not in regular contact with the Eket control room and the QIT had no aircraft traffic control services. In 
addition, Mobil subjected the entire workforce to a regimented lifestyle, restricting their movement. This led to the 
exacerbating psychological stress, coded under customer organisation process. Without adequate and well supported 
resource management as required from the customer both the operating organisation and staff are at risk leading to 
an unsafe situation.
The other external influences in Nigeria were politics and security, coded as a contributing factor with 6.7% of 
codes analysed. The security in the area of operation accounted for the majority of the codes identified at this level. 
This category was identified in 57% of codes analysed while the politics contributed 43%.The political and societal 
insecurity playing out between the government, oil producing companies and the Niger Delta militant group led to 
constant fear of being kidnapped by the staff of the operating company. According to the investigation report ‘In 
Niger Delta, the disrespect for local governance rules and lack of transparency, lack of consideration of local 
businesses in the award of contract and employment, failure to honour and implement memorandums of 
understanding between the oil and gas companies and the host communities contributes to youth restiveness and 
conflict’ (AIB Report, 2008).This led to a significant change in the security procedures of the entire Bristow 
helicopters (NIG) Ltd and MPN Eket.As a result, the situation led to an unsafe situation.In the UK report, Helideck 
operator influences were coded as the least contributing factor with 1.7% of codes analysed. Resource management 
accounted for the majority of the codes identified at this level. This category was identified in 67% of codes 
analysed, followed by the organisational climate with 33%.Alongside with the regulatory influences, the report 
encouraged the UK helideck operators to make changes to the helideck lighting at the earliest practical 
opportunity.Within the aviation industry, it has been established that human error plays a significant role in 
accidents (Reason, 1990; Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003). These studies showed that the HFACS-HE framework 
could be used to systematically identify underlying human factors causes of accidents beyond the organisational 
level. Results suggest that ‘latent’ causal factors are more highly associated with the accident of the HFACS-HE 
framework in both countries – Nigeria and UK.
Table 1 reveals the highly coded factors at each level of the HFACS-HE framework in both countries. At the 
lowest level, judgement and decision making errors were associated with the highest percentage of cases for both 
accidents, although the specific form of judgement and decision making error did differ in some instances. The 
majority of causal factors at the precondition for unsafe activity level differ from each other except the technological
Table 1. HFACS-HE factors in the Nigeria and UK report.
HFACS-HE Nigeria HFACS-HE United Kingdom
Level 5- External Influences Regulators, Customers, Other Factors Regulators, Other factors
Level 4- Organisational Influences Organisational climate, Organisational Resource Management, Organisational 
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process climate, Organisational process
Level 3- Supervision Inadequate Supervision, Planned 
Inappropriate, Failure to correct known 
problems
Failure to correct known problems
Level 2- Preconditions for Unsafe 
Acts
Technological environment, psycho-
behavioural factors and physical/mental 
limitations
Physical &Technologial Environment, 
perceptual factors, coordination, 
communication and planning factors, Self 
imposed stress
Level 1- Unsafe Acts Judgement and Decision Making, 
Exceptional Violation
Skill-based, Judgement and Decision 
Making, Routine violation
environment. While the Nigeria accident was associated with the condition of the individual, the UK accidents were 
associated with personnel factors. These differences showed that although the same error forms are identified in 
both countries, the underlying causes are different. Similar to the supervisory level, organisational influences were 
also associated with operational processes and operation climate in both countries. Results suggest that irrespective 
of the country of operation accidents could result from the high level system latent factors. External causal factor 
categories also differ in the cases studied. While the Nigeria accident was associated with the regulatory, customer 
and other factors – politics and security, the UK accident was associated with the regulatory (the common factor) 
and other factors – helideck operator.
6. Conclusions
HFACS framework is a useful tool in identifying the root causes ofaccidents within the limits of the organisation. 
These case studies identified other causal factors not included in the original HFACS framework, which would be 
useful during the investigation process. The aim is to simplify the problem correction and recommendations 
implementation.Another advantage of this study is that it can be compared with other studies already carried out. 
For instance, underlying causal factors for the accidents in the UK should be similar to those accidents in the 
UK.Finally, some of the results from this analysis were similar to those found from other studies. The major 
difference between these findings and preceding studies using the HFACS framework is that the violations were not 
associated with many of the accidents and no external factor identified (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2001; Shappell et 
al., 2007). The results also show that leadership and organizational factors such as oversight and program 
management are more likely to impact on the severity of an accident. By using the structured system framework to 
identify human errors in accidents, the HFACS-HE can be used in other industries apart from aviation to enable
effective safety interventions. The next step in continuing this research would then be to merge the cultural factors 
into the HFACS-HE framework to form an effective error management framework. Ultimately, the research aims to 
work with accident investigators, safety personnel, risk managers, operators, regulators and members of 
management to develop interventions focusing on reducing the identified human error problems with the system and 
cultural perspective.
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